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APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action attacking the validity of Salt Lake 
County's zoning ordinance restricting the development 
of private property in the canyons East of metropolitan 
Salt Lake City to 50 acres for each private dwelling struc-
ture. 
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The action is divided into four causes in the alterna-
tive. The first in the nature of a constructive taking. The 
second for damages against the individuals on the basis 
of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of their properties 
without just compensation. The third, asking for declara-
tory judgment asking the ordinance to be declared illegal 
and unconstitutional; and the fourth, asking for writs 
of mandamus requiring the defendants to issue certain of 
the plaintiffs building permits. The District Court dis-
missed the first two causes of action before trial and dis-
missed the last two causes of action after trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1965, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
passed a master plan for Salt Lake County. In that master 
plan they designated certain areas of the canyons to be 
parks and recreation and open-space areas (Ex., 15-P, Tr., 
p. 191). 
In 1970 and 1971, the United States Forest Service 
negotiated with plaintiffs in an effort to acquire or trade 
properties to get them out of the canyon areas (Tr., pp. 
613,619,756,765,766). 
In 1971, some of the plaintiffs made plans to develop 
their properties in Albion Basin above Alta Utah by erect-
ing multiple housing units thereon. In regard to this 
effort, they requested from the United States Forest Service 
a permit for the right of way for sewer. Said permit was 
temporarily denied on November 8, 1971 (Ex. 74-D, Tr., 
p. 538). One of the reasons given therein for the refusal 
to grant to plaintiffs a right of way was the desire of the 
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Forest Service to acquire the plaintiffs' properties in this 
area. Another of the reasons was that with the further 
development in Alta, there wouldn't be room in the sewer, 
The Forest Service owns almost all of Alta (Tr., p. 615). 
Plaintiffs' properties are outlined in Ex. 44-P and Ex. 
67-D. The County put temporary regulations into effect 
on the 19th day of May, 1971, without publishing these 
temporary regulations (Tr., p. 527, Ex. 11-P). The County 
interprets commercial as being anything over a single 
family dwelling (Tr., p. 423). 
On August 24, 1971, the County Planning Commis-
sion, after a helicopter trip with the United States Forest 
Service, met with the County Commission during a hear-
ing on the proposed county zoning of the canyons. During 
the meeting, Commissioner McClure pointed out that be-
fore the County Commission could consider adopting an 
ordinance, a recommendation was needed from the Plan-
ning Commission. He stated his opinion that if the canyons 
are to be enjoyed by the residents, there must be restric-
tions before the ground is all developed for private use. 
(Ex.42-P). 
Notice of a public hearing in regard to the amending 
of the zoning map by reclassifying the canyons from un-
zoned to FR-50 was promulgated on the 30th of August, 
1971 (Ex. 13-P). This Notice was published once in the 
Salt Lake Tribune on the 3rd day of September, 1971, and 
the hearing was held on the 4th day of October, 1971 
(Ex. 14-P, Tr., p. 214). There was not an unzoned classi-
fication in the county zoning ordinance, nor did the Com-
mission have a zoning map of the canyons (Tr., p. 395). 
3 
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At the October 1971 meeting, it was discovered that 
the zoning ordinance did not provide for FR-50 zoning. 
So, the County Commission set November 10, 1971 as 
the time to have a hearing to establish FR-50 zoning and 
other regulations. The County Commission held that this 
October 6th hearing be taken under advisement until after 
the November 10th meeting (Ex. 14-P). The November 
10th meeting was advertised in the Salt Lake Tribune 
once on the 11th day of October, 1971 (Tr., pp. 95, 128). 
At the November 10, 1971 meeting (Ex. 12-P), Mr. 
Barnes, in the second full paragraph, pointed out changes 
made from the original proposal from the County Plan-
ning Commission. The County Commission adopted this 
change in the zoning, setting forth the FR-50 zone and 
other regulations including the naming of new districts 
for the canyons. This ordinance was passed on the 10th 
day of November, 1971 (Ex. 1-P). This ordinance was 
passed under the provisions of Sec. 17-15-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, to take effect immediately 
upon publication as being necessary for the immediate 
preservation of the peace, health and safety of the county 
(Ex. 1-P). 
The ordinance amending the classification of the 
canyon from unzoned to FR-50 was passed on November 
15, 1971, five days later, again to take effect immediately 
upon publication, for the preservation of the peace, health 
and safety of the County (Ex. 9-P). 
The minutes of the November 15, 1971 meeting (Ex. 
7-P), show that Commissioners McClure and Dunn ex-
pected this ordinance to be of a temporary nature, to last 
4 
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six months. It is indicated from Ex. 7-P that the Commis-
sioners did not consider FR-50 zoning to be reasonable 
and that they did not intend the FR-50 zoning to be perma-
nent and they expected to change the zoning in May of 
1972 so that they could complete a zoning plan. 
There was some question in the minds of the County 
Commissioners McClure and Dunn as to whether or not 
there was a necessity for the immediate passage of the 
ordinance for the immediate peace, health and safety of the 
County (Tr., pp. 657, 558, 559). 
On the 1st day of October, 1971 plaintiff Albion 
Basin Development Company made an application with 
the County for a building permit for the building of a 
fourplex and plaintiff Marvin Melville made an applica-
tion for a building permit for a fourplex (Ex. 24-P, 25-P, 
17-P and 20-P). 
On the 29th of September, 1971, the Board of Health 
gave clearance for the building of plaintiff Melville's 
fourplex, and on October 1, 1971, they gave clearance for 
the Albion Basin fourplex (Ex. 19-P, 20-P, 22-P), (it ap-
pears that Ex. 20-P and Ex. 22-P are the same instrument). 
On the 4th day of November, all requirements for the 
permits were met except the zoning (Tr., p. 133). 
On November 5, 1971, the County Health Depart-
ment withdrew their prior approval (Ex. 21-P). The Board 
of Health's action was taken after conferences with the 
Zoning and Planning Department, and was on the ground 
of a bigger developmet than two-fourplexes (Tr., pp. 
338, 339). 
5 
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During the period of time the temporary regulations 
were in force, the County granted five building permits for 
residential construction without any reference to the Plan-
ning and Zoning Department (Ex. 37-P, 38-P, 39-P, 40-P, 
41-P). Further, the County granted seven commercial 
building permits without zoning approval (Ex. 29-P, 30-P, 
32-P, 34-P, 35-P, 36-P). 
There are many public pronouncements and indica-
tions which would lead to the conclusion that the main 
purpose of the FR-50 zoning was to stop private develop-
ment in the canyons and particularly plaintiffs' proposed 
development until such time as the properties could be 
acquired for public purposes (Ex. 16-P, 42-P, 15-P, Tr., 
pp. 345, 347, 459, 469, 470, 471, 473, 474, 477, 613, 619, 
631, 639). The Forest Service told the County Commis-
sion that proposed developments were in the area of a pro-
posed ski run (Tr., pp. 469, 470, 471), yet the Forest Ser-
vice stated that there was not a formal application for a 
ski run (Tr., pp. 639, 640). 
The zoning has diminished the value of plaintiffs 
Marvin A. Melville and Renee B. Melville and Albion 
Basin Development Company's properties in the Albion 
Basin above Alta. Albion Basin Development Company's 
four lots have been diminished in value from $75,200 to 
$17,500, or a diminution of $57,700; and on Melville 
Lots 1 and 2, from $62,400 to $8,750, or a diminution of 
$53,650; and on Lots 29 and 30, from $33,600 to $8,750, or 
a dimunition of $24,850; and on the 20 acres above the 
Albion Basin subdivision (Ex. 47-P), from $640,000 to 
$15,000, or a loss of $625,000 (Tr., pp. 299, 300, 301), 
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and the other parcels from the amounts as specified in 
the Complaint (Tr., pp. 119, 287, 138), to approximately 
$8,750 per individual parcel. There was no evidence in 
contradiction to the plaintiffs' appraisal witnesses. 
Plaintiff Albion Basin's properties have water (Ex. 
58-D), and storage for the water of approximately one-half 
million gallons (Tr., p . 259), Ex. 46-P). The Health De-
partment has ultimately granted their permission for two-
fourplexes (Ex. 22-P, 23-P). Plaintiffs Melville and Albion 
Basin have met all requirements for a building permit at 
the present time except zoning (Tr., pp. 136, 139, 140). 
There is no engineering reason why plaintiffs' pro-
posed development on their Albion Basin properties can't 
be carried out (Tr., pp. 333, 334). Plaintffs Albion Basin 
Development Company and Marvin Melville were only 
proposing to develop two-fourplexes, or eight units, and 
a public water system requires ten units or 50 or more 
people (Tr., p . 336). The State does not have regulations 
for private water systems (Tr., p . 367). 
The Health Department's withdrawal of permission 
was predicated upon a larger development than two-four-
plexes (Tr., p . 368). The County has no water rights in 
the canyon. The plaintiff Albion Basin Development 
Company, under the current health regulations for sewage, 
could develop as big a development as they desired as 
long as they had sufficient ground for absorbtion of the 
water and large enough vaults (Tr., pp. 373, 374, 383). 
Absorbtion in the Albion Basin properties was plenty ade-
quate (Tr., p . 376). Relatively speaking, the public will 
7 
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create more pollution than a private dwelling with waste 
disposal available (Tr., p. 377). The County had never 
referred any proposed development to the State for ap-
proval over nine units until plaintiffs' fourplexes were 
submitted (Tr., p. 383). 
The Albion Basin subdivision was approved on the 
10th day of December, 1962, and filed in the County Re-
corder's Office on January 24,1963. The Salt Lake County 
Board of Health approved the subdivision on the 6th day 
of November, 1962 (Ex. 43-P). 
On May 31, 1972, a hearing was held to amend the 
FR-50 zone to allow smaller parcel of useage and to pro-
vide other regulations in regard to that zoning (Ex. 69-D). 
The Notice of Publication and the Notice of Hearing was 
published one time on the 29th day of April, 1972, to 
amend the zoning as proposed on May 31, 1972, and the 
matter was taken under advisement (Ex. 6-P). 
The amended ordinances were proposed on the 4th 
day of June, 1972 and were put into effect under the pro-
vision that the passage of the ordinance was necessary for 
the immediate peace, health and safety of the County and 
the inhabitants thereof. The ordinances were passed some 
15 days after the hearing (Ex. 3-P, 4-P, 5-P). 
The minutes of the meeting held June 14, 1972 do 
not set out the provisions of the ordinance as passed. The 
only reference in the minutes to the zoning ordinance is 
as follows: Commissioner Ralph Y. McClure made the 
motion that they approve the canyon zoning as submitted 
by the Planning Commission. The role was called author-
8 
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izing the Chairman of the Board to sign the ordinance 
and the Clerk to attest his signature and to have pub-
lished in a newspaper of general circulation showing the 
vote to be: McClure, Aye; Blomquist, Aye; Dunn, Aye. 
This is found on the 10th page of Ex. 5-P. 
It is the practice of the Commission to have all ordi-
nances as passed set forth verbatim in the minutes (Tr., 
p. 529). The zoning maps of the Salt Lake County as 
promulgated by the Salt Lake City Commission and the 
County Planning Commission are not filed in the County 
Clerk's Office (Tr., p. 526). The zoning maps which 
were to be attached to the ordinance passed, being Ex. 3-P, 
which would be the most current zoning ordinance in the 
canyon, was not filed in the County Clerk's Office (Tr., 
p. 527). The temporary regulations as originally passed 
by the County Commission, being Ex. 11-P, was not pub-
lished (Tr., p. 527). The zoning maps were not filed in 
the County Recorder's Office (Tr., pp. 465, 466, 467). The 
zoning plan was not submitted to the State Planning Co-
ordinator (Tr., pp. 520, 521). There were no zoning dis-
tricts created to cover the canyon areas (Tr., pp. 535, 544). 
There was no immediate necessity for the preservation of 
peace, health or safety of the County in passing the last 
zoning ordinance (Ex. 3-P, 4-P; Tr., p. 533). 
On the 1st day of June, 1973, the District Court 
granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First 
and Second Causes of Action with prejudice (Tr., p. 108). 
9 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ZONING ORDINANCES ZONING 
THE CANYONS EAST OF SALT LAKE VAL-
LEY FR-50 ARE ILLEGAL AND INVALID 
BECAUSE THE COUNTY FAILED TO COM-
PLY W I T H THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
STATE ZONING STATUTES. 
On the 19th day of May, 1971, the Salt Lake County 
Commission promulgated temporary regulations covering 
the canyons East of the Salt Lake Valley. Said temporary 
regulations were promulgated under the provisions of 
§ 17-27-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
which provides as follows: 
"Promulgation of Temporary Regulations. The 
board of county commissioners of any county after 
appointment of a county or district planning com-
mission and pending the completion by such com-
mission of a zoning plan, may, where in the opinion 
of the board conditions require such action, promul-
gate by resolution without a public hearing regu-
lations of a temporary nature, to be effective for a 
limited period only and in any event not to exceed 
six months, prohibiting or regulating in any part 
or all of the unincorporated territory of the county 
or district the erection, construction or alteration of 
any building or structure used or to be used for 
any business, industrial or commercial purpose." 
(Emphasis added) 
This provision provides that the Board of County 
Commissioners, pending the completion by the Planning 
Commission of a zoning plan, may promulgate the resolu-
tion without a public hearing, regulations of a temporary 
nature for a period not to exceed six months covering con-
10 
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struction for business, industrial or commercial purposes, 
and does not cover construction of a residential nature. 
These temporary regulations as passed by the County 
Commission pending the completion by the Planning Com-
mission of a zoning plan, were put into effect without 
any notice to the public of any sort and without complying 
with the provisions of § 17-15-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, which requires that all ordinances prior 
to becoming effective, shall be published in a newspaper 
at least once. 
The provisions of § 17-27-19, UCA, 1953, as amend-
ed, provides that the resolution can go into effect without 
a public hearing. However, when such regulations have, 
in essence, the full force and effect of an ordinance and 
effect the property rights of the citizens of the County, such 
regulations, in order to be effective, should be published 
as an ordinance. McQuillin Municipal Corporation, 3rd 
Ed., Vol. 5, § 15.08, p . 73: 
"Resolution is said to be only a less solemn or less 
usual form of an ordinance. 'It is an ordinance still 
if it is anything intended to regulate any of the 
affairs of the corporation', and if it is in substance 
and effect an ordinance.'' 
(Id. § 15.03, P. 56:) 
"When ordinance is Necessary". 
(Id. § 15.04, P. 58-60) 
"Illustrations . . . to regulate and control the man-
ner of constructing dwelling houses and other 
buildings and structures . . ." 
At the end of the six month period, the County Com-
mission, being very anxious to promulgate new zoning in 
11 
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the canyons, and not, at the time, having a zoning plan, 
passed two ordinances, one on November 10, 1971, and 
one on November 15, 1971. In these ordinances, the one 
which was passed November 10th provided for the promul-
gation of certain zoning classifications including FR-50 
which is designated as Forestry Recreation Zones 50 and 
adds the names of several new planning districts. The 
ordinance as passed on the 15 th of November, 1971 pro-
vides that the revised ordinance of Salt Lake County, 1966, 
as amended, is hereby amended to include all of the can-
yons and classifies them from unzoned to Forest Recreation 
Zoned, FR-50. These two ordinances were passed under 
the provisions of § 17-27-14 which provides for amending 
district and zoning resolution in force and provides for 
publishing Notice one time. 
The Notice provided for the amendment of a zoning 
map whereby the zoning of all of the canyons East of Salt 
Lake would be reclassified from unzoned to FR-50. In 
actuality, at the time of said Notice, there was no zoning 
map covering the canyons East of Salt Lake County to 
amend, there was no planning district formed to cover 
the canyons East of Salt Lake County, nor was there any 
classification of FR-50. At the time of the passage of these 
ordinances, the canyons East of Salt Lake County had no 
zoning and what the County Commission was attempting 
to do by amending their zoning ordinances was to add a 
large part of the county to the zoning ordinance. 
In order to add new territory to the zoning ordinance, 
the County has to comply with the provisions of § 17-27-
10, UCA, 1953, as amended. This section provides that 
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prior to zoning all or any part of the County, a zoning 
plan should be certified and this includes any amendment 
to any previous zoning plan or any addition thereto. After 
receiving the certification of the zoning plan and before 
the adoption of any zoning resolution, a public hearing 
shall be held and notice shall be given by four publications. 
The provisions of § 17-27-10 which are the provisions 
that govern new zoning, were admittedly not complied 
with. The provisions of § 17-27-11 provide for the estab-
lishment of zoning districts. The last sentence of said sec-
tion provides: 
"Zoning, unless county-wide, shall be limited to 
districts established by the board of county com-
missioners, either on petition as hereinbefore (here-
inafter) provided or by direct action as hereinbefore 
provided/' 
It was admitted at the time the ordinances were 
passed that zoning in Salt Lake County was not county-
wide. It was further admitted that districts covering the 
canyons East of Salt Lake County had not been established 
either by the Board of County Commissioners or on peti-
tion as provided in the zoning statutes. 
Both of the sections referred to, 17-27-10 are couched 
in mandatory language and provide that the notice shall 
be given and in 17-27-11 shall be limited. Therefore, the 
ordinances as passed by Salt Lake County covering the 
canyons East of Salt Lake County are invalid and of no 
force and effect since Salt Lake has not complied with the 
provisions of § 17-27-10, UCA, 1953, as amended, which 
covers the promulgation of new zoning, nor the provi-
sions of § 17-27-11 which provides for zoning districts. 
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Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning, 2nd ed. Vol. 3, pp. 
1891-1893. "Failure to comply with provisions of 
State Law governing publication of Notice of pub-
lic hearing, invalidated zoning ordinance." 
See Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 Ut. 2d 310; and 
In Re: Phillip's Estate, 86 Ut 358. 
In addition to failing to comply with those two pro-
visions, the County did not comply with the provisions 
of § 17-27-20, UCA, 1953, as amended, which provides for 
the submitting of any zoning plan to the State Planning 
Commission before finally adopting such plan. At the time 
of the passage of this provision, there was not a State Plan-
ning Commission in effect. However, thereafter the State 
Legislature established a State Planning Coordinator 
which would effectively cover any and all duties that 
might be required by a State Planning Commission. 
It was the intent of the State Legislature that the State 
Planning people should have the right to submit their ad-
vice and criticism in respect to such planning prior to its 
finally being adopted by any county. Further, § 17-27-24, 
UCA, 1953, as amended, provides that: 
"Upon the adoption of any zoning ordinance or 
regulation, map or maps, the Board of County 
Commissioners shall file a certified copy of each in 
the office of the County Clerk and Recorder which 
copies shall be accessible to the public." 
Salt Lake County has not and does not comply with the 
provisions of § 17-27-24, UCA, 1953, as amended. There-
fore, it is next to impossible for the public to determine 
whether or not their properties are covered by any zoning 
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regulation map or maps. The provisions of § 17-27-24, 
UCA, 1953, as amended, are also couched in mandatory 
terms. 
The County Commission of Salt Lake County, in May 
of 1972, after the promulgation of a zoning plan by zoning 
commission, amended the earlier ordinance which pro-
vided that all of the canyon area be zoned FR-50 to a less 
restrictive zoning in accordance with the amendment. 
This, again, was promulgated after only one notice of the 
zoning hearing and again failed to establish any zoning 
districts covering the canyons. 
Clearly then, in the County's haste to zone the canyons 
where no zoning had been in force, instead of following 
the provisions of the statute covering new zoning, they 
attempted to do the same thing by an amendment to their 
current zoning. This is particularly interesting in that the 
County Commission themselves recognized the need for 
the zoning plan in passing the temporary regulation and, 
in essence, extended the temporary regulation for another 
six months from November 1971 to May of 1972 through 
the ploy of adopting the FR-50 zoning. The force and effect 
of the zoning, as promulgated, and the desire of the plan-
ners and the County Commission, is to be able to direct 
and control each individual proposed development as it is 
submitted, which, in effect, would be spot zoning. 
In the original notice as provided for the promulga-
tion of the amendment to the zoning map, it was thought 
that what the County Commission was trying to do was 
amend their official map in that there was not zoning 
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covering the canyons. The provisions of § 17-27-7, UCA, 
1953, as amended, provides for publication of three suc-
cessive weeks. However., this was not what the County 
Commission was attempting to do. What they were at-
tempting to do was to add new zoning and provide a new 
zoning map covering areas of Salt Lake County which did 
not have a zoning map prior to the proposed zoning, nor 
did they have any classification covering the unzoned 
territory. 
The provisions of the statute are clear and unam-
biguous and before the County is allowed to substantially 
effect property rights, they should comply with the pro-
visions of the State Statutes and for failure to do so, such 
zoning ordinances are illegal. 
Notice has been held to be a mandatory requirement 
in the passage of these restrictive ordinances. 
POINT II 
THE ZONING ORDINANCES COVER-
ING THE CANYONS EAST OF THE SALT 
LAKE VALLEY ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AS BEING A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES WITHOUT 
JUST COMPENSATION. 
The FR-50 zoning ordinance covering all of the can-
yons East of Salt Lake County and its amendments are un-
constitutional. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States provides: 
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"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval force, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation." 
Section 22, Article I of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation." 
There have been many cases interpreting the provi-
sions of the Constitution and the differentiation between 
the police power of the sovereign and the provisions of the 
Constitution requiring just compensation. It has been 
suggested that the Constitutional provisions in regard to 
the protection of private property evolved out of the 
common law and the expression of such common law by 
Sir William Blackstone: 
"So great moreover is the regard of the law for 
private property, that it will not authorize the least 
violation of it; no, not even for the general good of 
the whole community. If a new road, for instance, 
were to be made through the grounds of a private 
person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial 
to the public; but the law permits no man, or set 
of men, to do this without consent of the owner of 
the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of 
the individual ought to yield to that of the com-
munity; for it would be dangerous to allow any 
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private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the 
judge of this common good, and to decide whether 
it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in 
nothing more essentially interested, than in the 
protection of every individual's private rights, as 
modeled by the municipal law. In this and similar 
cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently 
does, interpose and compel the individual to ac-
quiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not 
by absolutely stripping the subject of his property 
in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full 
indemnification and equivalent for the injury 
thereby sustained. The public is now considered 
as an individual, treating with an individual for 
an exchange. All that the legislature does is to 
oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a 
reasonable price; and even this is an execution of 
power, which the legislature indulges with caution, 
and which nothing but the legislature can perform." 
Robert Malcom Kerr, The Commentaries on the 
Laws of England of Sir William Blackstone, (1876) 
at 109-110. 
In the present case, the County is trying to acquire 
the private property in the canyon areas for the use of 
its citizens by passing FR-50 zoning. The real purpose of 
the passage of the zoning is spelled out clearly by Com-
missioner Blomquist and by Commissioner McClure. Com-
missioner McClure spells out the intention, first at the 
meeting of the Planning Commission on August 24, 1971. 
Further, the minutes of the November 15th Commission 
meeting points out why Commissioner McClure is voting 
the way he is. (Ex. 7-P). Commissioner Blomquist spells 
out in great detail the ultimate purpose of the FR-50 zon-
ing and the desire and need felt by the Salt Lake County 
Commission to restrict development until such time as 
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the United States Government could acquire the prop-
erty through the offices of the Forest Service even though 
there is no question that the Forest Service did not have 
sufficient funds to carry out the acquisition program nor 
has Congress appropriated them (Tr,, pp. 469-477). The 
passing of zoning ordinances for the purpose of delaying de-
velopment until the public acquires the property or for 
the development of public facilities, is clearly a taking of 
the property in the constitutional sense and makes the 
ordinances unconstitutional. 
2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.3 (3rd ed. 
1970) states: 
"The weight of authority . . . is not in support of 
this strict construction (of taking). The modern, 
prevailing view is that any substantial interference 
with private property which destroys or lessens its 
value (or by which the owner's right to its use or 
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged 
or destroyed) is, in fact and in law, a 'taking* in 
the constitutional sense, to the extent of damages 
suffered, even though the title and possession of 
the owner remains undisturbed." 
Certainly under this concept, the restricting of the use of 
plaintiffs' property to one house per fifty acres, particularly 
when the property is less than fifty acres, is a restriction 
that amounts to a taking. In this regard see United States 
v. Lynch, 188 U.S. 455 (1903); United States v. 677.50 
Acres of Land in Marion County, Kan., 239 F. Supp. 318 
(D.C. Kan. 1965), flood control dams backing water over 
private property was held to be a taking. United States v. 
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373. In Robertson v. City 
of Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604, the city zoning of property 
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close to the State Capitol to prevent development so prop-
erty could be acquired in future by the State also held to 
be a taking under the Federal Constitution. See also Miller 
v. City of Beaver Falls, 82 A(2d) 34, stopping development 
for future public park held invalid; Peacock v. County of 
Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845; Kissinger v. City of 
Los Angeles, 327 Pac. 10, zoning for airport development 
held invalid; Sanderson v. Wittmar, 162 N.W. 494; Chase 
v. City of Glen Cove, 246 N.Y.S. 2d 975; Greenhills Home 
Owners Corp. v. Village of Greenhills, 202 N.E. 2d 192; 
and Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A(2d) 765, zon-
ing lots no less than two acres along roads and no less 
than three acres in the interior held unconstitutional. 
The question evolves itself around the idea, is the 
protection of the property for the use of the residents of 
the County and for recreational purposes a legitimate 
function of the zoning? 
The landmark United States Supreme Court case that 
deals with this question of police power or taking was the 
case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 
S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922). This case dealt with legis-
lation dealing with mine subsidence which dealt with two 
Pennsylvania State Statutes known as the Fowler Act and 
the Kohler Act. The Fowler Act, establishing the Pennsyl-
vania State Anthracite Mine-Cave Commission, and the 
Kohler Act, which prohibited the mining of coal so as to 
cause the subsidence of any building, structure or trans-
portation route within the limits of a designated class of 
municipalities. The Act made it unlawful so to mine an-
thracite coal as to cause the caving-in, collapse or subsidence 
of: 
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"(a) Any public building or any structure custo-
marily used by the public as a place of resort, 
assemblage or amusement, including, but not being 
limited to, churches, schools, hospitals, theatres, 
hotels, and railroad stations. 
(b) Any street, road, bridge or other public pas-
sageway dedicated to public use or habitually used 
by the public. 
(c) Any tract, roadbed, right of way, pipe, conduit, 
wire or other facility used in the service of the 
public by any municipal corporation or public 
service company as defined by the Public Service 
Company law. 
(d) Any dwelling or other structure used as a 
human habitation or any factory, store, or other 
industrial or mercantile establishment in which 
human labor is employed. 
(e) Any cemetery or public burial ground." 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared the 
Kohler Act constitutional and specifically held the Kohler 
Act a valid exercise of the state's police power. The coal 
company appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
The opinion was written by Justice Holmes. Holmes chose 
to concentrate on the taking claim and framed the issue an 
exercise of the police power to protect the public health 
and safety against an ever-growing hazard, or was the Act 
merely a way of getting the coal company's property 
without paying for it. The question was whether the 
Kohler Act tried to accomplish through police power regu-
lation what could only be accomplished by eminent do-
main. 
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"Government hardly could go on if to some extent 
values incident to property could not be diminished 
without paying for every such change in the gen-
eral law. As long recognized, some values are en-
joyed under an implied limitation and must yield 
to the police power. But obviously the implied 
limitation must have its limits or the contract and 
due process clauses are gone. One fact for con-
sideration in determining such limits is the extent 
of diminution. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not in all cases there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to 
sustain the act. So the question depends upon the 
particular facts. The greatest weight is given to 
the judgment of the legislature, but it is always 
open to interested parties to contend that the legis-
lature has gone beyond its constitutional power." 
"It is our opinion that the Act cannot be sustained 
as an exercise of the police power, so far as it af-
fects the mining of coal where streets or cities in 
places where the right to mine such coal has been 
reserved. As said in a Pennsylvania case, Tor prac-
tical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right 
to mine it.' Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal 
Company, 256 Pa. St. 328, 331. What makes the 
right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exer-
cised with profit. To make it commercially im-
practicable to mine certain coal has very nearly 
the same effect for constitutional purposes as ap-
propriating or destroying it. Thus we think we are 
warranted in assuming the statute does . . ." 
"The general rule at least is, that while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 
This Pennslyvania coal case appears to be the case 
that has set the perimeters for all subsequent taking cases 
and the Supreme Court has rarely taken cases involving 
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the regulation of land since the handing down of this 
decision. It appears that the Supreme Court prefers to 
leave these subjects to the State Courts. 
In the present case, one piece of property in particu-
lar has been reduced in value from $640,000 to $15,000 
or a dimunition of $625,000, solely related to the zoning 
ordinance. When a piece of property has its highest and 
best use for a multiple dwelling and then is diminished 
to value to one house per 50 acres in order to protect the 
canyons for public use, surely this goes beyond the rights 
of the legislature and is in effect, an exercise of the 
eminent domain. 
In the case of Baker v. Planning Board of Farming-
ton, 353 Mass. 141, 228 N.E. 2d 831 (1967), the land 
owned by Mrs. Baker consisted of eleven acres of land 
which had come to be surrounded by subdivisions of the 
town of Farmington. The town had held an easement for 
a ditch to conduct storm waters across the property since 
1934 which had originally been sufficient to accommo-
date all runoff. However, as the area was developed, the 
ditch became inadequate, and during heavy rains and 
thaws the property served as a retention area for flood 
waters. 
Mrs. Baker's proposed subdivision was disapproved 
because the creation of the subdivision would deprive the 
town of the retention basin and as a result, overtax the 
downstream drainage facilities. The Court cited the find-
ing of a master in the case: 
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"The board had but a single reason for disapprov-
ing the . . . (definitive) plan, namely, the extra 
cost to the town of handling the sewage and sur-
face drainage produced by the subdivision." 
Speaking to the taking issue, it went on: 
"Obviously a planning board may not exercise its 
authority to disapprove a plan that a town may 
continue to use the owner's land as a water storage 
area and thereby deprive the owner of reasonable 
use of it." 
As this case demonstrates, when the regulation ap-
pears to be designated to secure land for a public facility 
such as a retention basin the Courts are likely to feel that 
condemnation is the only appropriate technique. 
In the case of MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of 
Duxbury, 356 Mass. 696, 255 N.E. 2nd 289 (1969), this 
case involved the interpretation of the zoning by-law 
adopted. 
"For the purpose of protecting and preserving from 
despoliation the natural features and resources of 
the town, such as salt marshes, wetlands, brooks 
and ponds. No obstruction of streams or tidal 
rivers and no excavation or filling of any marsh, 
wetland or bog shall be done without proper 
authorization by a special permit issued by the 
Board of Appeals." 
The town board had repeatedly denied an application 
by Mr. MacGibbon to fill portions of estuarine wetland 
which he owned. The Court in MacGibbon read Massa-
chusetts zoning enabling legislation narrowly to prohibit 
such action by towns in the state: 
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"The preservation of privately owned land in its 
natural, unspoiled state for the enjoyment and 
benefit of the public by preventing the owner from 
using it for any practical purpose is not within the 
scope and limits of any power or authority dele-
gated to municipalities under the Zoning Enabling 
Act." 
Professor Van Alstyne, in an excellent article written 
for the Southern California Law Review, "Taking or 
Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Con-
demnation Criteria," 44 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1, citing the gen-
eral principal says: 
"A regulation which restricts the use of private 
property solely to governmental functions, such 
as use for public schools, public parks, or public 
housing as a prelude to later eminent domain pro-
ceedings, is uniformly regarded as an unconstitu-
tional infringement of private property rights. 
Even in the absence of a limitation of public activi-
ties, highly restrictive use regulations, imposed for 
the purpose of preventing private developments 
that would increase the cost of planned future ac-
quisitions of the subject property for governmental 
purposes, are equally invalid." 
To determine what the County has in mind for plain-
tiffs' properties, all one has to do is look at the master 
plan as set out in Ex. 15-P which shows some of plaintiffs' 
properties designated for use as park, recreation and open-
spaces and Ex. 16-P, the general plan for Alta in Little 
Cottonwood Canyon which shows some of plaintiffs' 
properties planned for proposed public acquisition for 
recreation. Commissioner McClure in the minutes of the 
November 15, 1971 meeting (Ex. 7-P) states: 
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"First and foremost, the canyons must be protect-
ed for public use. The general public must be al-
lowed an opportunity to reach and see the beauty 
of the canyons. Continued unrestricted private de-
velopment will reduce the public recreational value 
of the canyons." 
Chief planner Campbell (Tr., p. 233) states: 
"It (the FR-50 zone) was intended to accomplish 
the purpose of the master plan. The zoning was in 
FR-50 which was to create recreational, maintain 
a recreational area." 
Commissioner Blomquist (Tr., pp. 469-477) states 
without hesitation or reservation that the purpose of the 
FR-50 zoning was to block private development (and in 
particular plaintiffs' private development) for public pur-
poses. In fact, there is really no contradiction to what the 
main purpose of the FR-50 zoning was by anyone at the 
Trial. The purpose as of the zoning is a legal conclusion 
and not a finding of fact. 
The County goes to a great deal of trouble to try and 
justify its restrictive zoning on the basis of its need to 
protect the water supply. The County has no vested inter-
est in the water, the water being owned by Salt Lake City. 
Further, the State Legislation has provided legislation to 
allow the City to have jurisdiction over its watershed which 
allows the City to enact ordinances to prevent pollution 
and contamination and to provide for permits for the con-
struction and maintenance of any closet, privy, outhouse or 
urinal. This provision can be found in § 10-8-15, UCA, 
1953, as amended. 
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The plaintiffs have met all requirements as provid-
ed by the Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City Board of 
Health in regard to any question of pollution and even 
though water protection is a legitimate exercise of the 
police power, the private property owners cannot be ex-
pected to carry the full burden for such protection. 
In Pittsburg Coal Company v. Sanitary Water Board, 
4 Pa. Cmwlth 407, 286 A. 2d 459 (1972), a majority of the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court found that a regula-
tion requiring treatment of mine waste waters before dis-
charge to be a taking of the operator's property rights. 
The mine was operated at the lowest point in the basin's 
seam of coal and was beneath some 100 to 350 billion 
gallons of polluted waters in abandoned mines higher 
on the sloping coal seam. Three natural out-flows totaled 
17 million gallons a day. 
The mine operator argued that of the 3.44 million 
gallons of water discharged which it pumped daily from 
its mine, only 1.27 million originated from its mine, the 
rest coming through breaches in the barrier between the 
mine and the huge adjoining pool. Therefore, it proposed 
to treat only its 1.27 million gallons under the Pennsyl-
vania Pure Streams Law. Faced with an order to cease 
operations if it did not treat its discharge, it appealed to 
the Courts relying heavily on the constitutional prohibition 
against taking property without compensation. 
The majority of the judges sitting found: 
"No matter how meritorious the desired results 
may be, the use and enjoyment of property by its 
owner should not be burdened or impaired in the 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
name of public health, safety or welfare absent a 
rational relationship between the evil sought to 
be cured and the use of property as contributing 
to the evil. It is at this point that curing the evil 
should be assumed as a direct responsibility of 
government and not placed upon the property 
owner in the guise of an exercise of the police 
power." 
In cases of this nature, there has to be a rational re-
lationship between the evils sought to be cured and the 
use of property as contributing to the evil. There is no 
evidence that the restriction of the use of property to one 
house per 50 acres is going to affect the quality of the 
water or any other legitimate area of the police power 
regulation. Particularly this is so if the reason for the re-
striction is to allow the use of the private properties by 
the public. The concept of restricting private property 
development so that the public use can be exploited is 
contrary to any idea of protecting watersheds. 
The Albion Basin properties of plaintiffs', even at 
their most maximum use, would only bring 200 to 300 
people into the area. However, with the development of a 
ski lift, the Forest Service proposes to bring into the area 
thousands. Common sense would indicate that thousands 
of the public would pollute the water supply more than 
hundreds of private dwellers wherein private dwellers 
provide for the elimination of their own waste. 
It is hard to understand why the County feels like 
it has a right to restrict the use of private property for the 
benefit of its citizens for forestry and recreation purposes. 
What use does the owner have of his property as forest 
or public recreation? 
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Ordinarily, we wouldn't be concerned with what pur-
pose the legislative body had in passing legislation. How-
ever, when their purpose is clear and is spelled out, then 
it becomes a legitimate area of inquiry by the Courts. Salt 
Lake County and the United States Forest Service have 
made no bones about their desire to acquire the private 
property in the canyon areas for public purposes and have 
spelled out that desire in many conferences and meetings 
and as the head of the Planning Department of Salt Lake 
County, Mr. Douglas Campbell spelled out in his testi-
mony (Tr., pp. 347, 348), the Forest Service and County 
have a community of interest in this area. 
See Gibbons and Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake, 19 
Ut. (2d) 329: 
"Although the wisdom and the nature of zoning 
power has been left in the discretion of the City 
authorities, the Courts may still intervene and set 
aside their action if said ordinances are confisca-
tory, discriminatory, or unreasonable." 
Clary v. Eatonville, 124 A.(2d) 54: 
"While motives of the legislative body may not be 
subject to inquiry in determining validity of legis-
lation, there is a well recognized exception to the 
rule where motivation is disclosed on the face of the 
act, assimilable to declaration of legislative interest, 
or as a part of legislative proceedings, and where 
Mayor of Village read statement in presence of mem-
bers of board of trustees as exposition of zoning 
action about to be taken by the board, such state-
ment was properly admissible in weighing validity 
of board's action." 
DeSena v. Gulder, 265 N.Y.S. (2d) 239: 
"Rule which prohibits in case of attack, an ordi-
nance which is valid on its face and inquiry into 
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legislative motivation, absent showing of fraud, 
personal interest, or corruption, does not bar ju-
dicial inquiry into purpose of zoning ordinance." 
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 661: 
"The Courts are not bound by mere forms nor are 
they to be misled by mere pretenses, they are at 
liberty — indeed are under a solemn duty — to 
look at the substance of things, whenever they enter 
upon the inquiry whether the legislature has tran-
scended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a 
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect 
the public health, the public morals, or the public 
safety, has no real or substantial relation to those 
objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured 
by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the Courts 
to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Con-
stitution." 
Also see Wital Corp. v. Denville, N . J. 225 A(2d) 139. 
There is also a question as to whether or not the ordi-
nance is unconstitutional as an abridgment of the plain-
tiffs' right to contract. The FR-50 zoning restricts the de-
velopment of properties to one lot per 50 acres which 
means that there is no way that the owners of the prop-
erty could distribute or alienate their property for parcels 
less than 50 acres. You would need 100 acres to subdivide 
the property into two lots. What happens if someone were 
to die who owned acreage in the canyon zoned FR-50? 
How is it going to be divided? How can he transfer the 
property to sellers or heirs? 
Further, the FR-50 zoning is discriminatory. If a 
person needs 50 acres to build a cabin in the canyons, only 
the rich will have the opportunity of having second homes 
in the canyon areas. 
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There is absolutely no showing on the part of the 
County that there is any relationship between the need to 
restrict the use to 50 acres per lot to any evil that might 
need to be corrected under the police power. 
POINT III 
THE ZONING AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE BUILDING REGULATIONS ON PROP-
ERTIES IN THE CANYONS EAST OF THE 
SALT LAKE VALLEY ARE ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE. 
After the passage of the temporary regulations, but 
prior to the passage of the FR-50 zoning in November of 
1971, some of the plaintiffs made application for a build-
ing permit for two-fourplexes in a subdivision which had 
been approved both as to water and sewer disposal and 
all other factors some nine years prior to the building 
permit application. The Board of Health granted their 
approval for the two-fourplex units and upon being in-
formed by the Zoning Department about the fact there 
was no zoning and the plaintiffs involved were proposing 
a larger development than two-fourplexes, they withdrew 
their prior approval. In fact, plaintiffs were not pro-
posing anything but applications for building permits for 
two-fourplexes. The County considers any building over 
a single residence to be commercial and, as such, under the 
provisions of the temporary regulations, even though the 
statute, § 17-27-19, UCA, 1953, as amended, provides for 
restriction only on permits for any business, industrial or 
commercial purposes. The Building Enforcement Division 
in interpreting the temporary regulations, granted five 
building permits for residential permits in the same area 
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as plaintiffs' Albion Basin properties, and seven com-
mercial permits. Even though the temporary regulations 
provides that all applications for permits for commercial 
purposes should be reviewed by zoning. Yet, the Building 
Enforcement Division refused to grant to plaintiffs, resi-
dential permits. 
The Court has just recently ruled on a question sim-
ilar in Contract "Bunding Mortgage Exchange, a Utah cor-
poration v. Darrell Maynes and Salt Lake County, #13608, 
which opinion was filed November 4, 1974. The with-
holding of the permits was done for the purpose of delay-
ing plaintiffs' construction until after the zoning ordinance 
was passed. 
A reading of the ordinance as found in Section VIII, 
Title 22, Zoning Ordinance (Ex. 1-P) shows the following: 
"Site Plan approval for Single Family Dwellings: 
In order to determine compliance with this ordi-
nance and to promote orderly and harmonious de-
velopment of canyon areas, site plans for single 
family dwellings shall be approved by the Zoning 
Administrator prior to issuance of any building 
permits. Applications for site plan approval shall 
be accompanied by a site plan, elevations and trans-
verse and longitudinal sections showing the re-
lationship of the construction to the natural grade 
and finished grade. Drawings show proposed signs, 
landscaping, exterior material, color schedules and 
all other information necessary to enable the Zon-
ing Administrator to make the findings as set 
forth above. Applications may be approved as sub-
mitted, approved subject to conditions, or disap-
proved. Actions of the Zoning Administrator shall 
be subject to appeal to the Planning Commission." 
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This shows the degree of control that is placed in the 
hands of the Zoning Administrator. There is no indication 
as to what landscapes, exterior materials or color schedules 
might be acceptable, all this to be left to the asthetic judg-
ment of the Zoning Administrator. This section is so 
broad as to be incapable of understanding and places in 
the hands of the Zoning Administrator too much arbitrary 
power into determining what would be acceptable. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' M O T I O N TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES 
OF ACTION. 
If you assumed all of the fates as alleged in plaintiffs' 
Complaint in regard to their First and Second Causes of 
Action to be true, there is no question under the argu-
ments as set forth in argument two that the defendants' 
actions amount to a taking of the private property and, 
as such, the plaintiffs should be reimbursed for such 
taking. 
There is no question but what plaintiffs cannot re-
cover on both the First and Third Causes of Action, and 
if the Statute is declared unconstitutional, then plaintiffs 
would be reinstated to all their rights in the use of their 
properies. However, these causes of action were pleaded 
in the alternative as is provided in the rules, and this 
option should be left with the plaintiffs. 
The Second Cause of Action is founded upon the ac-
tions of the individuals and alleges a conspiracy to deprive 
the plaintiffs of the value of their property in violation of 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
their constitutional rights. Such allegations consist of pur-
posely devaluing plaintiffs' properties in order for the 
governmental entities to acquire said properties at a fu-
ture date, all actions being outside the scope of their em-
ployment. The facts as alleged are that the employees of 
the County and the employees of the Federal Government 
have met together and worked out a plan whereby all of 
the development on plaintiffs' properties would be stopped 
with the intent that either the Federal Government or 
the Salt Lake County would acquire the property at a 
future time at a lesser cost, or would not have to acquire 
such property. These facts, as alleged, fit the definition 
of criminal conspiracy which is defined under § 76-12-1, 
UCA, 1953, as amended: 
"If two or more persons conspire: (4) to cheat and 
defraud any person of any property by any means 
which are in themselves criminal, or by any means 
which if executed would amount to a cheat, or to 
the obtaining of money or property by false pre-
tenses . . ." 
Certainly the acts of conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs 
of the value of their property do not fit in the confines 
of the defined duties of the defendants in their employ-
ment. In Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce 
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, the question of when and how actions 
may be maintained against the employees of the Federal 
Government and, I would assume this would apply to the 
employees of the County Government, is gone into in 
great depth. In that matter the Supreme Court said: 
"If an action is such to create a personal liability 
whether sounding in tort or in contract, the fact 
that the defendant, as an officer, is an instrumen-
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tality of the sovereign does not forbid a Court from 
taking jurisdiction over a suit against him, since 
the principle that an agent is liable for his own 
torts applies to acts of public officers or public in-
strumentalities. 
A suit for specific relief against a public officer is 
not a suit against the sovereign, where the suit is 
directed against action which the officer purports 
to take as an individual and not as an official, or 
which is beyond statutory limitations of his powers, 
or is taken under statute or order claimed uncon-
stitutionaL" 
In the Larson case, the question was not so much 
whether or not you could sue the agent in damages, but 
whether or not you could bring an injunctive action 
against him. There, the Court ruled that if the damages 
sought to be recovered were against the individual and not 
the government, then the suit could be maintained and the 
Court will further maintain an action enjoining the agents 
from acting where the officer's powers are limited by 
statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered 
individual and not sovereign actions, the officer is not 
doing the business which the sovereign has empowered 
him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign 
has forbidden. The second type of case is that in which 
the statute or ordinance conferring power on the officer to 
take action in the sovereign's name is claimed to be un-
constitutional. Then there is a right of action against the 
individual. 
In the present circumstances, the actions alleged are 
not only illegal as per the criminal code and tortious on 
that score, but are in violation of the plaintiffs' constitu-
tional rights. Since the plaintiffs are not seeking to re-
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cover in the second cause of action against the sovereign, 
i.e., the County, but are only seeking to recover against the 
individuals for the tortious acts alleged, and since the 
agents and officers are acting outside the scope of their 
authority in violation of the plaintiffs* constitutional 
rights, there is ample ground for granting damages against 
said individuals. 
The main theory is not that the defendants passed an 
ordinance, but that they met together to deprive plain-
tiffs of the value of their property and whether or not the 
defendants were employees of some governmental body or 
not would make no difference, for if any individual con-
spired to defraud the plaintiffs of their property, the plain-
tiffs would have an action to recover for such conduct. 
See also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643. 
POINT V 
THERE IS NO NEED TO GO TO THE 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR ADMINIS-
TRATIVE RELIEF IF THE RELIEF BEING 
SOUGHT IS A TESTING OF THE VALIDITY 
OF THE ORDINANCE THAT WOULD GIVE 
THE JURISDICTION. 
The provisions of § 17-27-15, UCA, 1953, as amend-
ed, provide: 
"Any zoning resolution of the board of county 
commissioners may provide that the board of ad-
justment may in appropriate cases and subject to 
appropriate principles, standards, rules, conditions 
and safeguards set forth in the zoning resolution, 
make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning 
regulations in harmony with their general purpose 
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and intent. The commissioners may also authorize 
the board of adjustment to interpret the zoning 
maps and pass upon disputed questions of lot lines 
or district boundary lines or similar questions, as 
they may arise in the administration of the zoning 
regulations." (Emphasis Added). 
The Board of Adjustment has jurisdiction in regard to 
zoning matters, and when there is no zoning, there 
is no need to refer to the Board of Adjustment. 
Certainly the Board of Adjustment is not in a posi-
tion to rule on the validity of the zoning ordinance giving 
them jurisdiction. These plaintiffs are not seeking to find 
relief from any determination of the zoning ordinance. 
They are seeking to have the zoning ordinance declared 
invalid as being completely illegal and unconstitutional. 
The Board of Adjustment has no authority or jurisdiction 
to make any such interpretation of the zoning ordinance 
they might be trying to rule on. The rule that the party is 
required to exhaust all administrative remedies does not 
apply when the party is questioning the validity of the 
ordinance that gives the administrative body jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Salt Lake County and its officers and em-
ployees, in the Fall of 1971, passed FR-50 zoning on all 
of the canyons East of Salt Lake County. This zoning was 
new zoning and not an amendment of any existing zoning 
ordinance. The defendants admittedly passed the canyon 
zoning ordinance which provided for the requirement of 
50 acres per residential lot, without following the require-
ments of the State Zoning Statute. Further, the County 
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has not filed their zoning maps with the Salt Lake County 
Clerk's Office nor the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office, 
nor have they given the state planning people a chance to 
review their zoning as required by Statute. 
The zoning ordinance was passed without the re-
quired notice given for new zoning ordinances and later 
in the Spring of 1972, after a plan was developed, they did 
not pass the new zoning ordinance, but amended the faulty 
ordinance passed in the Fall, again without forming 
zoning districts. So, clearly, the FR-50 zoning, as passed 
in the Fall of 1971, is invalid as not complying with the 
Statute's original requirements and the amendment to the 
invalid ordinance would also be invalid. 
The purpose of the FR-50 zoning was to acquire 
the private property for recreational purposes for the 
public and to stop development until the private prop-
erty could be acquired by a public agency and, as such, 
the zoning was unconstitutional. The purpose of the 
zoning is to be determined by the facts in the matter and is 
a legal conclusion. 
There is no relationship shown by the County be-
tween the necessity of 50 acres per lot and any evil that 
would need to be cured under the police power of the 
sovereign. The requirement of 50 acres per residential 
lot is unreasonable and diminishes the value of the prop-
erty to an extent that it leaves the owner of the property 
with no reasonable use for his property and amounts to a 
taking. Further, the limitation of 50 acres per lot restricts 
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the property owner's right to distribute or alienate his 
property to the extent of its being a violation of his right 
to contract under the Constitution. 
The defendants arbitrarily, capriciously and unrea-
sonably denied to two of the plaintiffs building permits 
on an approved subdivision for two-fourplexes, such 
denial being for the purpose of effecting the FR-50 zoning 
prior to those plaintiffs getting their building started, and 
those plaintiffs are entitled to a writ of mandamus re-
quiring the Building Enforcement Department of the Salt 
Lake County to issue their building permits as applied for. 
Therefore, the Trial Court's ruling should be reversed 
and the current canyon zoning should be declared illegal 
and unconstitutional and the County should be required 
to issue the building permits as applied for. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Joseph S. Knowlton 
Suite 204 Executive Building 
45 5 East Fourth South 
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